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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Gregg Miller challenges his convictions for misdemeanor injury to child and felony
eluding. As for the injury to child conviction, the jury instruction and the prosecutor’s closing
argument created a fatal variance with the information.

And the prosecutor secured both

convictions only after committing misconduct amounting to fundamental error at closing by
appealing to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury, and by misstating the evidence.
This Court should vacate Mr. Miller’s judgment of conviction and remand this case to the district
court for a new trial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Miller with felony eluding and misdemeanor injury to child for
allegedly speeding through a neighborhood with his son, SM, in the car, while a police officer
tried to pull him over. (R., pp.27–28, 43–44, 47–48.) With respect to injury to child, the
information specifically alleged that Mr. Miller endangered SM “by driving . . . in an aggressive
or reckless manner and while eluding law enforcement.” (R., p.48.)
The State called three witnesses at Mr. Miller’s jury trial—Mr. Miller’s wife, Rochelle
Miller, fourteen-year-old HE, and Officer Sanchez. The State also introduced two exhibits—a
map of the route Mr. Miller took and where he drove in relation to Officer Sanchez and others in
the area at the time, and a video taken by Officer Sanchez’s body camera of Officer Sanchez’s
pursuit and arrest of Mr. Miller. (See State’s Exs. 1, 21.) The defense presented no evidence.
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Mr. Miller has filed a motion to augment the record with State’s Exhibit 1, as well as a handful
of documents regarding the district court’s decision to place Mr. Miller on probation after his
period of retained jurisdiction.
1

Ms. Miller testified that she called the police after she and Mr. Miller got into an
argument about an incident between SM and another kid in their neighborhood, after which
Mr. Miller drove off “erratically” with SM in the car. (Tr.,2 p.84, L.14–p.90, L.8.) Officer
Sanchez met Ms. Miller at her house shortly after that. (Tr., p.90, L.9–p.91, L.3.) As the two
were talking, Ms. Miller saw that Mr. Miller was driving down the road toward them in his red
Camry. (Tr., p.91, Ls.11–17.) Mr. Miller then turned around and left down Jefferson Street, and
Officer Sanchez got into his patrol car and went after him. (Tr., p.91, L.17–p.92, L.6.)
Officer Sanchez testified that he followed after Mr. Miller with his lights and sirens on.
(Tr., p.113, L.16–p.114, L.1.) They drove through a neighborhood with a fifteen-miles-per-hour
speed limit, and Officer Sanchez estimated that Mr. Miller drove as fast as forty miles-per-hour.
(Tr., p.114, Ls.13–17.) While driving down Jefferson Street after Mr. Miller, Officer Sanchez
said he drove his patrol car by group of kids standing three to five feet from the edge of the road,
a group of elderly people also standing three to five feet from the roadway, and a group of kids
on tricycles or big wheels playing in the road on Third Street about ten feet from the
southernmost curb of Jefferson Street, which is where Mr. Miller turned north. (Tr., p.118,
L.14–p.125, L.20.)
In addition, HE testified that he was with a friend riding his bike on Sixth Street toward
the intersection with Jefferson Street. (Tr., p.98, L.10–p.99, L.7.) As he approached the stop
sign, his friend yelled at him. (Tr., p.99, Ls.13–17.) HE stopped and saw a Camry “fly by.”
(Tr., p.99, Ls.8–21, p.101, Ls.12–13.) HE described the distance between himself and the car as
“from here to the corner of the desk” (Tr., p.100, Ls.1–8), which was later described as “a few
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Citations to the transcript refer to the volume containing the trial and sentencing hearing.
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feet” (Tr., p.105, Ls.8–10). HE said he was “petrified” and that he then watched the car run a
stop sign across Highway 41. (Tr., p.100, L.11–p.101, L.11.)
Just over a minute and a half after Officer Sanchez started following Mr. Miller,
Mr. Miller pulled into a field near a house. (See State’s Ex. 2.) Officer Sanchez saw SM get out
of the car and run away as he was pulling up (Tr., p.129, Ls.15–25, p.131, Ls.10–16), though SM
is never visible on Officer Sanchez’s body camera video (State’s Ex. 2). Mr. Miller then got out
of the car and starting walking away, after which Officer Sanchez got out of his patrol car,
ordered Mr. Miller to the ground with his gun drawn, and arrested him. (Tr., p.131, L.14–p.132,
L.18; State’s Ex. 2 at 1:35–2:30.) Mr. Miller later told Officer Sanchez that what he did was
wrong, he had “eluded” him, and that he could have hit a kid, but denied running a stop sign. 3
(See State’s Ex.2; Tr., p.133, L.7–p.134, L.23.)
At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury that, to find Mr. Miller guilty of
injury to child, the State had to prove that Mr. Miller “wilfully [sic] caused or permitted the child
to be placed in a situation that may have endangered the child’s person or health,” without
specifying how Mr. Miller endangered SM. (R., p.98.)
The parties then presented their closing arguments. As for the injury to child charge, the
prosecutor told the jury:
Not only in [Mr. Miller’s] driving here did he endanger this child. When
he stopped in that field and let that child run out of there knowing that the police
were right there, right there behind him, you remember Officer Sanchez pulls his
gun, anything could have happened. So this was definitely a dangerous situation
that he placed his child right smack in the middle of.
(Tr., p.158, L.23–p.159, L.4.) When arguing that Mr. Miller drove in a way that endangered or
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Officer Sanchez also testified that Mr. Miller admitted to going thirty-five or forty miles-perhour. (Tr., p.134, Ls.9–10.) Counsel did not hear Mr. Miller say as much on the video. (State’s
Ex. 2.)
3

was to likely endanger others, the prosecutor said that if HE “had just taken a few more strides
on his bike, he may not have been here for you today to testify for you.” (Tr., p.155, Ls.17–19.)
The prosecutor also told the jury that “Officer Sanchez estimated about the car [sic] came within
about 5 feet of this group of elderly persons that were standing outside the church on the
roadway. About 10 feet from a group of children when he turned up on to 3rd Street from
Jefferson. Those also were near hits.” (Tr., p.156, Ls.12–17.)
The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. (R., p.107.) The court later sentenced
Mr. Miller to a unified term of four years, with one year fixed, for felony eluding, and credit for
time served for misdemeanor injury to child, and also retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.122–27.)
The court has since placed Mr. Miller on probation. (Aug., pp.3–5.) Mr. Miller timely appealed
from his judgment of conviction. (R., pp.129–31.)

4

ISSUES
I.

The information specified that Mr. Miller committed injury to child when he endangered
SM by driving aggressively and recklessly, while the jury instructions did not specify
how Mr. Miller endangered SM and the prosecutor told the jury at closing that Mr. Miller
also endangered SM by creating a situation in which SM was present while Officer
Sanchez had his gun drawn. Did the jury instruction and prosecutor’s argument create a
fatal variance with the information?

II.

The prosecutor told the jury in closing that a HE might not have been there to testify if he
had taken a few more strides on his bike, described the people Mr. Miller passed as “near
hits,” and misstated Officer Sanchez’s testimony in various ways. Did the prosecutor
commit misconduct amounting to fundamental error by appealing to the emotions,
passions, and prejudices of the jury, and by misstating the evidence?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court’s Jury Instruction On Injury To Child Combined With The Prosecutor’s
Closing Argument Regarding The Ways In Which Mr. Miller Committed Injury To Child
Created A Fatal Variance With The Information
“A trial court has the duty to properly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case
before it.” Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 313 (2010). “The
instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the charging document as to the means by
which a defendant is alleged to have committed the crime charged.” State v. Folk, 151 Idaho
327, 342 (2011) (citing State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 147 (2007)). If they do not, “there can
be a fatal variance between the jury instructions and the charging document.” Folk, 151 Idaho at
342; see also State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476, 479 (Ct. App. 2013).
A variance is fatal, thus violating due process and requiring reversal, if it deprives the
defendant of his right to fair notice of the charge against which he must defend. State v.
Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 417–18 (1985); State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 329–30 (Ct. App. 2001).
The notice element asks “whether the record suggests the possibility that the defendant was
misled or embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of his or her defense.” Windsor,
110 Idaho at 418.
The existence of an impermissible variance is a question of law which this Court reviews
de novo. State v. Alvarez, 138 Idaho 747, 750 (Ct. App. 2003). If a variance exists, the Court
must then decide whether it rises to the level of prejudicial error requiring reversal of the
conviction. Brazil, 136 Idaho at 330. When the error was not objected to, the defendant must
show that the error: “(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights;
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate
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record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and
(3) was not harmless.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010). To show the error was not
harmless, the defendant has “the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error
affected the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 226.
The district court’s jury instruction on injury to child and the prosecutor’s closing
argument regarding the ways in which Mr. Miller committed injury to child created a fatal
variance with the information. That variance rises to the level of fundamental error because it
deprived Mr. Miller of notice and thus due process, is clear from the record, and there is a
reasonable probability that it affected the verdict.

This Court should therefore vacate

Mr. Miller’s conviction for injury to child.

A.

The Variance Deprived Mr. Miller Of His Unwaived Right To Due Process
The district court’s jury instruction on injury to child and the prosecutor’s closing

argument regarding the ways in which Mr. Miller committed injury to child created a fatal
variance with the information. The information alleged that Mr. Miller committed injury to child
by specifically “driving an automobile, with the child as a passenger, in an aggressive or reckless
manner and while eluding law enforcement.” (R., p.48 (emphasis added).) The injury to child
jury instruction provided that, for the jury to find Mr. Miller guilty, the State had to only
generally prove that he “wilfully [sic] caused or permitted the child to be placed in a situation
that may have endangered the child’s person or health.” (R., p.98 (emphasis added).) And, at
closing, the prosecutor told the jury:
Not only in his driving here did he endanger this child. When he stopped
in that field and let that child run out of there knowing that the police were right
there, right there behind him, you remember Officer Sanchez pulls his gun,
anything could have happened. So this was definitely a dangerous situation that
he placed his child right smack in the middle of.
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(Tr., p.158, L.23–p.159, L.4.)
The overly-broad jury instruction, combined with the prosecutor’s last-minute assertion
that Mr. Miller committed injury to child by telling SM to get out of the car and go inside as
Officer Sanchez pulled in behind him and drew his gun, created a fatal variance with the
information which deprived Mr. Miller of notice and thus due process. See Windsor, 110 Idaho
at 418. The prosecutor did not mention this alleged means of committing the offense until her
closing argument, and defense counsel thus did not explore this allegation before or during trial.
In fact, as discussed in Issue II below, the evidence presented at trial flies in the face of the
suggestion that the prosecutor made here—that Officer Sanchez had his gun drawn while SM ran
from Mr. Miller’s car, and so “anything could have happened.

So this was definitely a

dangerous situation that he placed his child right smack in the middle of.” (Tr., p.159, Ls.1–4.)
To the contrary, Officer Sanchez’s testimony and his body camera video show that SM was not
present by the time Officer Sanchez got out of his car and drew his gun. (Tr., p.129, Ls.15–25,
p.131, L.10–p.132, L.18; State’s Ex. 2 at 1:35–2:30.)
Although the instruction at issue was a pattern jury instruction, see I.C.J.I 1243, and the
Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions are presumed correct, State v. Hopper, 142 Idaho 512, 514
(Ct. App. 2005), the State chose to specify in the charging document the conduct that it believed
constituted injury to child. For it to change its theory at the end of trial by telling the jury that it
could convict Mr. Miller of injury to child for supposedly creating a situation in which Officer
Sanchez drew his gun in SM’s presence—a theory condoned by the very broad jury instruction—
the State deprived Mr. Miller of notice and thus his ability to put on a defense. The error
therefore violated Mr. Miller’s right to due process.
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B.

The Variance Plainly Exists In The Record
The variance is clear from the information, jury instruction, and closing argument (R.,

pp. 48, 98; Tr., p.158, L.23–p.159, L.4), and it was surely not a tactical decision by Mr. Miller to
not object, see Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. No “reasonable trial strategist” would elect not to object
to an invitation by the prosecutor to convict a defendant for conduct of which he had no notice
and which was factually unsupported. See State v. Sutton, 151 Idaho 161, 167–68 (Ct. App.
2011) (concluding that mere speculation that a defendant strategically failed to object was not
sufficient to find the error did not plainly exist).

C.

The Variance Was Not Harmless
There is a reasonable possibility that the variance affected the verdict.

See Perry,

150 Idaho at 226. The prosecutor alleged at closing that Mr. Miller had committed injury to
child in two ways—by driving recklessly and by telling SM to leave the car when Officer
Sanchez had drawn his gun. Of these two, a reasonable juror would likely find the latter is more
dangerous than driving forty miles-per-hour in a fifteen-mile-per-hour zone. And although the
evidence at trial does not support the State’s argument, jurors give special credence to the
arguments of prosecutors and thus could have relied on the State’s representation of what
happened. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87 (Ct. App. 2007) (prosecutors “are a part of the
machinery of the court, and . . . they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to
give more credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial”) (quoting
State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43–44 (1903). Regardless, there is no way to know whether the jury
found Mr. Miller guilty based on conduct with which he was actually charged, and so there is a
reasonable possibility that the variance affected the verdict.
Mr. Miller’s injury to child conviction and remand for a new trial.
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This Court should vacate

II.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Amounting To Fundamental Error By Appealing To The
Passions And Prejudices Of The Jury, And By Misstating The Evidence
The U.S. and Idaho Constitutions provide that no person can be “deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; ID. CONST. art. I, § 13.
Due process requires that criminal trials are fundamentally fair. Schwartzmiller v. Winters,
99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial misconduct may so unfairly contaminate a trial that the
resulting conviction is a denial of due process. State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App.
2005) (citing Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987)). If “a prosecutor attempts to secure a
verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence
admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this
impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.” Perry, 150 at 227.
Prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in constitutional principles over which this
Court exercises free review. See State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361 (2013). When a defendant
challenges un-objected to misconduct on appeal, he must persuade the Court that the error:
“(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists
(without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. To show the error was not harmless, the defendant has “the
burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the
trial.” Id. at 226.
The prosecutor in this case committed misconduct at closing by appealing to the
emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury, and by misstating the evidence. That misconduct
deprived Mr. Miller of his due process right to a fair trial, the misconduct is clear from the
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record, and there is a reasonable possibility that the misconduct affected the verdicts. This Court
should therefore vacate Mr. Miller’s convictions and remand for a new trial.

A.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Which Violated Mr. Miller’s Due Process Right
To A Fair Trial By Appealing To The Emotions, Passions, And Prejudices Of The Jury,
And By Misstating The Evidence
It is misconduct for the prosecutor to appeal to the passions and prejudices of the jury and

misstate the facts. See State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, ___, 399 P.3d 804, 829 (2017) (stating
that “the prosecutor has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of the facts and unnecessarily
inflammatory tactics”) (quoting State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871 (2014)); State v. Phillips,
144 Idaho 82, 87 (Ct. App. 2007) (“appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through
use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible”).
The prosecutor in this case committed misconduct by appealing to the emotions,
passions, and prejudices of the jury, and by misstating the evidence. In doing so, the prosecutor
relied on factors other than the applicable law and the facts adduced at trial, and thus violated
Mr. Miller’s due process right to a fair trial. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; IDAHO CONST.
art. I, § 13; Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
The prosecutor said that if HE “had just taken a few more strides on his bike, he may not
have been here for you today to testify for you.” (Tr., p.155, Ls.17–19.) The prosecutor also
told the jury that “Officer Sanchez estimated about the car [sic] came within about 5 feet of this
group of elderly persons that were standing outside the church on the roadway. About 10 feet
from a group of children when he turned up on to 3rd Street from Jefferson. Those also were
near hits.” (Tr., p.156, Ls.12–17.) Finally, the prosecutor said that when Mr. Miller stopped, he
let SM “run out of there knowing that the police were right there, right there behind him, you
remember Officer Sanchez pulls his gun, anything could have happened. So this was definitely a
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dangerous situation that he placed his child right smack in the middle of.” (Tr., p.158, L.23–
p.159, L.4.)
The prosecutor’s statements that HE might not have been here had he taken a few more
strides on his bike, and that the group of elderly people and children were “near hits,” are
inflammatory comments that sought to appeal to the passions and prejudices of the jury by
suggesting, incorrectly so, that Mr. Miller almost hit multiple people and almost killed HE.
(See Tr., p.155, Ls.17–19, p.156, Ls.16–17.)
The prosecutor’s assertions also misstate the testimony. The statement about HE taking a
few more strides with his bike is problematic because HE was approaching a stop sign at which
he would have been legally required to yield to cross-traffic, see I.C. § 49-720(1), but the
prosecutor’s argument assumes that HE would have blown through the stop sign without obeying
the law, and that it would nevertheless be Mr. Miller’s fault if HE got hit (see Tr., p.99, Ls.8–21,
p.155, Ls.17–19). The prosecutor also misstated the facts when claiming that Mr. Miller drove
five feet from the group of elderly people who were on the roadway and ten feet from a group of
kids. (See Tr., p.156, Ls.12–17.) With respect to the group of elderly people, Officer Sanchez
testified that they “were standing probably the same distance, 3 to 5 feet from the roadway”
when Officer Sanchez drove by, but that Officer Sanchez could not see where that group of
people was when Mr. Miller drove by them. (Tr., p.119, Ls.6–25 (emphasis added).) As for the
kids, Officer Sanchez said that they were in the road on Third Street “within maybe ten feet from
the southernmost curb line of Jefferson Road,” but did not specify how close they were to
Mr. Miller when he drove by on Jefferson. (Tr., p.123, L.24–p.125, L.14.) For this reason, there
was no evidence that the group of elderly people or kids were “near hits.” The elderly people
were not standing in the road and there was no testimony that Mr. Miller ever drove off of the
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road. Similarly, making a turn more than ten feet away from the kids on bikes cannot be
reasonably construed as a near hit—if that’s the case, then pedestrians are routinely “near hits”
when they walk down any sidewalk adjacent to traffic. Finally, the prosecutor’s suggestion that
Mr. Miller put SM “right smack in the middle” of a situation where an officer had drawn his gun
is belied by the evidence. (Tr., p.158, L.23–p.159, L.4.) According to Officer Sanchez’s
testimony and his body camera video, SM had run off by the time Officer Sanchez got out of his
car and drew his gun. (Tr., p.129, Ls.15–25, p.131, L.10–p.132, L.18; State’s Ex. 2 at 1:35–
2:30.)
The prosecutor’s argument appealed to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury
while misstating the evidence. Because the prosecutor attempted to secure a verdict on factors
other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, the
prosecutor violated Mr. Miller’s unwaived due process right to a fair trial.

B.

The Misconduct Plainly Exists In The Record
This prosecutorial misconduct is clear on the face of the record (see Tr., p.493, L.11–

p.529, L.22), and it was surely not a tactical decision by Mr. Miller to not object, see Perry,
150 Idaho at 228. No “reasonable trial strategist” would elect not to object to misconduct which
appeals to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury and misstates the evidence.
See Sutton, 151 Idaho at 167–68. The prosecutor’s inflammatory tactics and misstatements
could only harm Mr. Miller.

C.

The Misconduct Was Not Harmless
There is a reasonable possibility that the prosecutor’s misconduct at closing affected the

outcome of the trial. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. To secure a felony conviction for eluding,
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the prosecutor had to show that Mr. Miller drove “in a manner as to endanger or likely to
endanger the property of another or the person of another.” I.C. § 49-1404(2)(c). And the
evidence that Mr. Miller had put anyone or anything in danger was not overwhelming by any
means—he allegedly drove twenty-five miles-per-hour over the speed limit past a teenager on a
bike who had to yield to Mr. Miller, a group of elderly people standing three to five feet from the
side of the road, and children on bikes ten feet south of the southernmost curb of an intersection
where Mr. Miller turned north. (Tr., p.99, Ls.8–21, p.119, Ls.6–25, p.123, L.24–p.125, L.14.)
Especially putting these statements together, there is a reasonable possibility this misconduct
affected the eluding verdict. See State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 70–71 (2011) (explaining that
the Court will take into consideration whether or not the prosecutor is engaging in a pattern of
misbehavior).
Similarly, the prosecutor’s suggestion that the jury convict Mr. Miller of injury to child
based on its new theory that Mr. Miller put SM in danger when Officer Sanchez had his gun
drawn is more compelling than its argument that Mr. Miller put SM in danger by driving twentyfive miles-per-hour over the speed limit. (See Tr., p.158, L.1–p.159, L.4.) There is thus a
reasonable possibility that the prosecutor’s assertion affected the jury’s verdict on that charge.
Because the prosecutor violated Mr. Miller’s unwaived right to due process, the
misconduct is clear from the record, and there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected
the verdict, the misconduct amounts to fundamental error.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Miller respectfully asks that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand
for a new trial.
DATED this 20th day of November, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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